

Exercise	FE23
Category	Port Facility Exercises
Type	Unauthorized Access
Security Level	1 and 2
References	 Port Facility Security Plan Relevant Port Facility security instructions, regulations and memorandums APEC Manual of Maritime Security Drills and Exercises Vol II Part 1 – Guidelines for the Conduct of Maritime Security Exercises ISPS Code Part A sections 14.2.1 to 14.2.4, 14.3, 14.4, 16.2 and Part B sections 15, 16.10 to 16.29

INTRODUCTION

- 1. The control of access to Port Facility premises is a primary security measure imposed by all Port Facilities. The security afforded by good access control affects all aspects of port operations, from the safety of personnel and equipment to the security of cargo, and even to the bonded status of that cargo. Access control includes perimeter security, and personnel and vehicle/vessel checks upon entry/exit. The integrity of access control measures depends on the control measures put in place, the maintenance of those measures and the quality of the personnel manning and maintaining them. In most cases, management of access control is inherited, and performed as a business-as-usual function. Thus, it is useful to undertake a periodic review of all access control measures and processes as a whole.
- 2. These guidelines are prepared as a tabletop simulation exercise. Selected drills from the APEC Manual of Maritime Security Drills and Exercises Volume I Part 2 may be incorporated to make it a full scale or live exercise.

AIM OF THE EXERCISE

- 3. The aim of this exercise is to examine all aspects of the threat of unauthorized access in order to identify measures to mitigate the vulnerability of the Port Facility to this threat.
- 4. The principal objectives are:
 - a. To undertake a comprehensive review of the Port Facility's access control measures and processes.
 - b. To practice the command, control, coordination and communications for security activities both within and beyond the Port Facility.



REQUIRED ATTAINMENTS

- 5. On completion of the exercise:
 - a. Participants would be able to:
 - (1) Identify and describe the characteristics of effective access control measures.
 - (2) Recognize access control shortcomings in the Port Facility.
 - (3) Plan and implement measures against unauthorized access at the Port Facility.
 - b. A written operation plan for access control measures is to be prepared for submission to top management.

PLANNING FOR THE EXERCISE

6. **Timetable**

The date for the conduct of this exercise should be scheduled in the Port Facility's annual work program. Preparations for the exercise should commence 4 weeks prior to the date of conduct. An example of a time-table for the preparation and conduct of this exercise is given in Appendix 1.

7. Exercise Planning and Control Team

a. Exercise Director

The Exercise Director should be a member of senior management, preferably at the Deputy CEO or Director of Operations level. This level is advised because the Exercise Director is responsible for both exercise control as well as exercise participation.

b. <u>Control Team</u>

(1) The control team for a planning exercise need not be very substantial. However, should it be desired to make it a full scale or live exercise by incorporating one or more drills, then the control team recommended for the drills may be nominated as well. It should not be necessary to duplicate the teams for each drill incorporated.



- (2) The Chief Controller should be at the same level as the topmanagement individual whose portfolio includes responsibility for security at the Port Facility. In many cases, this could be at the Port Facility Security and/or Safety Manager level. This point is emphasized because planning and managing an exercise that involves a significant portion of the resources of a Port Facility may not be effective if the person assigned the task is from an inappropriate level.
- (3) Other controllers required are:
 - (a) One higher controller (Operations)
 - (b) One lower controller (possibly a Senior Security Supervisor)

c. <u>Participants</u>

All stakeholders in the performance of access control at the Port Facility should participate:

- (1) Port Facility Security and/or Safety Manager
- (2) Port Facility Security Officer (PFSO)
- (3) Logistics manager
- (4) At least one administrative staff member

8. **Resources**

a. <u>Location</u>

- (1) Planning and control room for the controllers.
- (2) Planning Room for participants.
- (3) Control Room or Operations Room for the execution phase of the exercise. If the Port Facility has a control or operations room, this should be used. Care should be taken to ensure there is no interference or confusion with normal Port Facility operations.
- (4) Conference Room for the presentation of the plan to management.

b. Communications

(1) **Equipment**

All the usual Port Facility communications means should be employed. If radio communications (including walkie-talkies) is to be part of the communications means, separate channels (from the usual operating channels) should be nominated for the purposes of the exercise, and a communications plan promulgated. Separate communications channels will also be required for controllers. See example in Appendix 2.



(2) Code Words

Code words are used to provide brevity and clarity in communications during the conduct of an exercise. A list of suggested code words is given in Appendix 2. Additional code words may be coined for specific circumstances e.g. the name of the exercise. The code words must be promulgated to all controllers and participants of the exercise.

(3) **Security**

Consideration should be given to the possible disclosure of confidential information (e.g. details in the PFSP) in all exchanges connected with the exercise, and appropriate precautions taken to avoid the release of such information to persons not authorized to receive it.

c. Other requirements

- (1) Equipment for the planning phase
 - (a) Local layout plans, charts and maps should be used to enhance realism, and the narratives adjusted for local context.
 - (b) Wyteboards and wyteboard markers
 - (c) PCs, printers and digital projectors
 - (d) Photocopier
 - (e) Stationery
- (2) Equipment for the execution phase will be as per the planning phase, plus standard Control or Operations Room equipment e.g.
 - (a) Status Boards
 - i. Operations status
 - ii. Deployment of forces, teams, personnel, vehicles, vessels, etc.
 - iii. Logistics status (fuel, water, supplies, breakdown & repair, etc.)
 - iv. Personnel status (manning, casualties, etc)
 - (b) Log and Record Books
 - i. Operations Log
 - ii. Communications Log
 - iii. Incident Log
- (3) Victuals and refreshments



9. **Management endorsement**

The Chief Controller should seek approval from management for the conduct of the exercise, as significant top management participation is expected.

CONDUCTING THE EXERCISE

10. Scenario

A scenario synopsis or narrative will be issued to initiate the planning process. A fictitious scenario of increasing instances of unauthorized access is painted, leading to the inevitable conclusion that access control at the Port Facility is in dire need of a thorough overhaul. The example narratives are provided in Appendix 3.

11. **Planning Process**

- a. Various planning processes and methods are available to formulate a plan against the threat of unauthorized access at the Port Facility. The following may be considered:
 - (1) The guidelines provided in ISPS Code Part B sections 15 and 16.
 - (2) The "Threat Evaluation and Risk Assessment" methodology advocated in IMO familiarization courses on the ISPS Code.
 - (3) Any other evaluative methodology e.g. ISO DIS 20858 on Ships and Marine Technology Maritime port facility security assessments and security plan development.
- b. The planning may take place over a period of one day, on completion of which a written access control plan should be prepared and presented to top management for formal endorsement. Plans developed must be:
 - (1) Suitable They must meet the requirements of the task, and provide a reasonable response to the threats.
 - (2) Acceptable They must be accepted from a personnel and organizational culture perspective.
 - (3) Feasible The plans must be realistic and achievable, including from a funding perspective.



12. Master Events List

- a. A generic Master Events List for this exercise is given in Appendix 4. The EPCT should add to or delete injects given in this list as required. The Chief Controller should monitor the development of the plan by the participants closely, and be prepared to introduce injects to test any new access control initiatives formulated during the planning stage. These should be incorporated in the Master Events List.
- b. In general, injects should seek to test:
 - (1) Command, control and coordination procedures and processes
 - (2) Communications channels and procedures.
- c. Some topics that may be considered for injects that test access control measures are:
 - (1) Type of personnel access control measures.
 - (2) Type of vehicle and/or vessel access control measures.
 - (3) Entry through a breach in the physical security measures e.g. a hole in the fence, or climbing over the fence.
 - (4) Entry through an unattended gate.
 - (5) Entry through inadequate access control processes.
 - (6) Inattentive security staff at a manned gate.
 - (7) Distraction of security staff by an accomplice.
- d. During the execution phase of a tabletop simulation exercise, injects from the Master Events List are issued by the Chief Controller to be acted upon by the participants. When the participants need to have some action carried out by a subordinate unit or individual e.g. security guards stationed at the entrance to the Port Facility, they are to message the instruction to the lower controller, who will then respond in appropriate time on the outcome of the action. This response should be consistent with the overall objective of the exercise and specific purpose of the inject.



13. **Briefings**

- a. A briefing to controllers will be conducted by the Chief Controller and should include the following:
 - (1) Objectives of the exercise.
 - (2) Scenario for the exercise.
 - (3) Roles to be played by controllers.
 - (4) Exercise injects, anticipated responses by participants, and feedback to be provided by lower controllers to participants for each response.
- b. A briefing to participants upon commencement of the exercise will include:
 - (1) Organization for the exercise.
 - (2) Details of the administrative and logistics arrangements.
 - (3) Exercise objectives.
 - (4) Task(s) assigned.
 - (5) Issue of narrative no.1.

CONCLUDING THE EXERCISE

- 14. The exercise is deemed to have been completed when:
 - a. The operations plan against the threat of unauthorized access is endorsed and printed following any adjustments after the formal presentation to management for approval. An example of a Plan is provided in Appendix 5.
 - b. The execution phase has been completed with the planned injects employed.
 - c. The Exercise Director so decides.

15. **Debrief**

- a. Where a full scale or live exercise has been conducted, the debrief of the live components (which may comprise a number of different drills) should be conducted as soon as possible after the exercise, and preferably on the same day. The debrief of the planning and tabletop simulation of the execution phase may be conducted later, as the operations plan would have been documented, and most decisions and actions recorded in the form of messages.
- b. Numerous messages may have been passed in the course of the execution phase of a tabletop simulation exercise. Only those relevant to specific lessons learnt may need to be preserved for the debrief, if only to serve as reminders for the points to be made.
- c. The Chief Controller should conduct the debrief.



d. Appoint a note-taker to record the salient points of the discussion and in particular the lessons learnt and any follow-up actions required. Guidance should be provided to the note-taker as to what is to be recorded.

16. **Reports**

- a. A formal report on the exercise should be submitted to management. The report will highlight the lessons learnt and significant recommendations from the review conducted as part of the tabletop simulation. If drills are incorporated in the exercise as the live component, the report should include the lessons learnt from the drills in the format for the drills reports in Volume I Part 2. Where appropriate, a copy of the report should be extended to the Designated Authority. An example of a report for the tabletop simulation is provided at Appendix 6.
- b. If there are significant issues and recommendations concerning the security of the Port Facility or proposing certain expenditures, a verbal presentation of the report at a top management meeting should be considered.

17. **Records**

An ISPS Drills and Exercises Record Book should be maintained by the Port Facility. The following is an example of an entry in the ISPS Drills and Exercises Record Book:

	ISPS Port Facility Drills and Exercises Record Book				
DATE	EVENT	ТҮРЕ	SUBJECT	REPORT REFERENCE	
	г .	D . E . '1'.	EE22		
	Exercise	Port Facility	FE23 –	PF/101/08-FE23	
		exercise	Unauthorized access	dated xx/yy/zzzz	



FE23 TIME-TABLE FOR PLANNING

DAYS TO EXERCISE	DATE	EVENT	СНЕСК
D -60		Confirm the exercise date	
	(calendar	Request participation in the exercise	
D -30		Confirm budget availability for items and/or	
	dates to	services to be employed during the exercise	
		Review Volume II Part 1 - Guidelines for the	
	be	Conduct of Maritime Security Exercises	
D -27		Appoint the Exercise Planning and Control	
		Team	
D -21	inserted)	Convene the initial planning conference	
D -21		Refine the scenario and narratives	
		Adjust the Master Events List	
D -14		Confirm the participants	
D -10		Obtain management endorsement	
D -7		Promulgate the Exercise Administrative Instructions	
D -2		Brief the controllers	
D to D +1		Conduct the exercise	
D+2		Record the conduct of the exercise	
By D +5		Conduct the debrief and record the lessons	
		learnt	
By D +7		Discuss follow-up actions with management	
By D +8		Submit the written report on the exercise	



COMMUNICATIONS

Example Communications Plan

Station	PFSO Control	Security Guard,	Security Guard,	Ship / Vessels	High Control	Low Control
Channel	Room	Fixed Stations	Roving			
Telephone	X	X	-	-	X	X
Mobile	X	X	X	X	X	X
Marine VHF	X	-	-	X	X	-
Walkie-Talkie Ch 1	X	X	X	1	X	X
Walkie-Talkie Ch 2	-	-	-	-	X	X

Example Code Words

Code words are used to provide brevity and clarity in communications during the conduct of an exercise. The code words listed below may be used to control the exercise. They are generally initiated by the Chief Controller.

CODE WORD	MEANING
Exercise Trojan	Exercise name (example only)
Horse	
Exercise Start	The exercise is to commence
Exercise Suspend	The exercise is temporarily suspended
Exercise Go	The exercise is to resume from where it was suspended
Exercise Stop	The exercise is to be terminated (prematurely)
Exercise End	The exercise is completed
For Exercise	The message or statement that follows this preamble relates to the exercise only, and is not to be confused with real activity. This should be used to prefix all telephone or radio
	communications relating to simulated events for the exercise e.g. "For exercise, I am from the Black September terrorist group. A bomb has been placed in your lobby."
No Duff	The message or statement that follows this preamble relates to a real event or instruction e.g. "No duff, Mr. KLJ has fallen and cut his hand at the Restricted Area Gate 3. Please send a vehicle to pick him up."



FE 23 SCENARIO SYNOPSIS

NARRATIVE NO. 1

General Security Situation

- 1. With increasing social inequity, the threats to the internal security of the country are steadily rising. There have been street demonstrations over the increase in fuel prices, and consequent increases in the cost of living. XYZ airport was the target of a suicide bomber on 4 Jul XX, but fortunately, not much damage was done, with 3 casualties but no deaths other than the bomber herself. On 5 Nov XX, the State Central Library was burnt down by an arsonist. The library has been very popular with the public but was slated for demolition by the State authority.
- 2. Of significance to the maritime industry, clandestine activists have threatened to disrupt the country's economy in order to de-stabilize the current government. One group has associated itself with sea robbers known to be operating within 70 nm from this Port Facility.

Security Incidents at the Port Facility

- 3. During the past year, management has been apprised of 4 breaches of the perimeter fence by thieves entering the Port Facility. Items stolen include small palletized cargo items awaiting containerization, ships stores awaiting embarkation, and copper cable for renovation works at the power transformer sub-station.
- 4. The Operations Manager had received a threat to beat him up, but this is believed to be related to management of stevedores at the Port Facility. No harm has yet befallen the Operations Manager.
- 5. At the main entrance, there have been 2 cases of attempted stowaways that were intercepted, and 2 ships complained of stowaways found on board after having sneaked into the Port Facility premises. One of the ships had actually sailed before the stowaway was found, and the stowaway was handed over to the police at the next port of call.
- 6. There were 3 cases of entry under false identity. All of them were laborers employed by contractors working on the new Wharf Delta. Two were illegal immigrants and the contractors were penalized by the State authority. This Port Facility was also fined for the infringement, even though we were the ones who reported the illegal aliens.



Costs of security lapses to the Port Facility

- 7. Total uninsured loss: \$7,560.00
- 8. Total insurance claims arising from the losses: \$115,470.00.
- 9. Increase in insurance premium attributed to the claims: \$3,550.00

Actions Taken

10. Owing to cost-cutting measures, the security department has been very understaffed and security personnel have even been employed in port operations work. Little action has been taken on the security lapses owing to the lack of funds. The PFSO has reported that unless something is done soon, the deteriorating security situation may see the total shutdown of the Port Facility if an attack were to be carried out on the Port Facility, with very serious consequences.

Recommendations

11. It is recommended that a thorough review of Port Facility access control measures be undertaken in view of the deteriorating security situation, and the increased risk to Port Facility operations.



NARRATIVE NO. 2

General Security Situation

- 1. The security situation has now become critical, with the threat of uncontrolled civil disobedience increasing dramatically. Despite a ban on strikes, there has been widespread worker dissatisfaction, and striking workers may be seen almost everywhere. Government forces have struck back at demonstrators, forcefully putting down demonstrations and preventing them from taking to the streets.
- 2. Two days ago, 1 person was killed and 5 injured when a nervous Police officer ordered his men to open fire into the crowd. In a bid to calm the situation, the government promised to prosecute the Police personnel involved but this has led the Police Chief to issue a statement declaring that the morale of Police personnel will be adversely affected, and the Police may not be able to do their job effectively. This apparent rift is expected to embolden demonstrators, and the threat of terrorist attacks against targets seen to be in support of the government has now increased significantly.

Maritime Industry

3. In view of the increased threat from civil disorder and terrorist activity, the Designated Authority has declared that the Security Level is to be raised to Security Level 2 with immediate effect. The Port Facility must act immediately to implement the measures for Security Level 2, and advise all ships alongside and vessels intending to call at the Port Facility of the change.

Security Incidents at the Port Facility

4. Port Facility security staff have had a difficult time trying to resolve the access control issues arising out of the apparent unauthorized access by one or two persons, and responding effectively to the threat they pose. The intruder or intruders are proving very elusive, and there is still no positive information on them.

Ship Alongside

5. MV YHN is alongside the Port Facility. The Ship Security Officer has been in contact with the PFSO following the Port Facility security staff queries over the alleged deliveries to the ship. The PFSO has informed the Ship Security Officer that the State Designated Authority has advised that Security Level 2 has been declared, and all Ports and Port Facilities are to implement the measures for Security Level 2 with immediate effect. The SSO has told the PFSO that the ship is at Security Level 1.



FE23 MASTER EVENTS LIST

SERIAL NO.	TIME	FROM	HIGH CONTROL INJECT / LOW CONTROL RESPONSE	PARTICIPANT'S EXPECTED RESPONSE
			LOW CONTROL RESPONSE	
Date:				
001	0900	High Control	Issue of Narrative No. 1	Planning for access control commences
002	1630	Management	Endorsement of the Plan	Participants should present the access control
				plan to top management for endorsement
Date:				
003	0700	Low Control	Security patrol reports that there is a hole in the perimeter fence big enough to let a person through	Security team 4 to investigate
004	0720	Low Control	The hole is at Fence Section number 34. The fence has been deliberately cut	Maintenance team to restore
005	0750	Low Control	Cut section of the chain link fence has been wired shut. No further action required.	Report on status
006	0800	High Control	Station engineer reports unidentified person seen at pumping station on the wharf without security pass	Security team to investigate
007	0900	Low Control	Pumping station searched thoroughly. Nothing found.	
008	1030	High Control	Gate 1 guards report one man creating a disturbance outside the gate	Report on what is happening
009	1035	Low Control	One man outside the left side of the gate was shouting and gesticulating wildly. He was screaming abuse at the government. We all went out there to try and pacify him.	Report on status



SERIAL NO.	TIME	FROM	HIGH CONTROL INJECT / LOW CONTROL RESPONSE	PARTICIPANT'S EXPECTED RESPONSE
010	1100	High Control	Accounts clerk reports unidentified man walking downstairs from the administrative office. He was dressed like a laborer, and was not wearing a security pass. When asked what he was doing there, he rushed down and out of the building.	Security team 4 to investigate
011	1130	Low Control	Surrounding areas of administrative office searched. Nothing found.	Control room alerted to watch surveillance monitors for strangers
012	1140	Low Control	Control room surveillance video playback shows man dressed in T-shirt and jeans in ground floor lobby running out of the building	Follow-up on measures for custody of the tape and coordination measures for further investigation
013	1145	Low Control	There is a man here wanting to visit MV YHN alongside at Wharf Charlie. He has no identification papers to exchange for a security pass. He won't go away and wants to speak to a manager.	To direct security guards to get his name and ask MV YHN if they know him or are expecting him. If they do, get them to escort him in and take responsibility for him.
014	1150	Low Control	MV YHN says they do not expect any visitors.	To direct security guards to reject the man's request for entry
015	1155	Low Control	The man has left	
016	1200	High Control	Security team 4 is continuing their search for one or two unidentified persons reported to be in the Port Facility premises	To ask the Station engineer how the person he saw was dressed
017	1215	Low Control	Station engineer reports that he could not tell for sure, but he thinks the man was dressed in jeans and T-shirt	To direct Security Team 4 to continue search for two intruders
018	1300	High Control	Guards at the main gate report a truck delivering ships supplies, but they do not have any record of ships supplies delivery today	To direct security guards to ask for details of the delivery



SERIAL NO.	TIME	FROM	HIGH CONTROL INJECT / LOW CONTROL RESPONSE	PARTICIPANT'S EXPECTED RESPONSE
019	1315	Low Control	The driver says he is delivering oxygen and acetylene welding gas to MV YHN. The truck is filled with 20 cylinders of each gas. There is one assistant with the driver.	To direct security guards to ask MV YHN if the have ordered any supply of welding gas, and from which company.
020	1325	Low Control	Security supervisor at the main gate was talking to the First Officer of MV YHN, when someone came on the line and confirmed that MV YHN had ordered the welding gas, and to kindly let the truck through. He said it was a last minute requirement and they forgot to notify the Port Facility.	To direct security guards to prevent the truck from entry pending further enquiries
021	1330	Low Control	The truck driver was issued with a visitor pass after he submitted a temporary identity document. He claimed that he recently lost his identity document, and he had not received a replacement yet. The truck has already proceeded into the Port Facility	To direct Security team 4 to proceed at once to MV YHN to stop the truck
022	1345	Low Control	Security team 4 reports no truck at MV YHN. Requests description of the truck	To direct Security team 4 to contact main gate for the description
023	1400	High Control	Issue of Narrative No. 2	To issue instructions for increase in Security Level measures, including exchange of DoS with ships
024	1430	High Control	Security guard reports that a speedboat racing past our Port Facility within the "No Entry" zone had ignored his hand signals and megaphone warning to clear off.	To direct security guards to continue to observe speedboat. To report intrusion to the State maritime and port security agency



SERIAL	TIME	FROM	HIGH CONTROL INJECT /	PARTICIPANT'S EXPECTED RESPONSE
NO.			LOW CONTROL RESPONSE	
025	1445	Low Control	Security guard reports observing an explosion at a ship alongside a nearby Port Facility. The explosion appeared to have been near the waterline, and the ship is now listing severely.	To report explosion to the State maritime and port security agency
026	1500	High Control	Truck delivering welding gas to MV YHN has defied orders to stop, and charged out the gate and raced away. It was carrying 3 persons in the cabin.	To direct Security team 4 to check MV YHN
027	1530	Low Control	MV YHN has one casualty with a head wound who claims he is the First Officer. He says he was hit on the head and lost consciousness.	To report assault of First Officer to State marine and port security agency. To arrange for medical treatment for the First Officer of MV YHN.
028	1545	Low Control	Security team 4 reports the SSO says MV YHN did not order any welding gas, and they cannot find any welding gas cylinders on board.	To direct Security team 4 to search the Port Facility's Restricted Area
029	1600	Low Control	Security team 4 reports finding the welding gas cylinders scattered along the road outside a warehouse with highly flammable cargo stored in it	To direct Port Facility fire services to respond. To inform State marine and port security agency.
030	1610	Low Control	Mechanic reports that he saw the truck going fast around a bend and the cylinders falling off, then the truck raced off without stopping	To address issues and follow-up measures
031	1615	Chief Control	End of exercise	Participants to summarize what they thought had happened.

Notes:

- 1. This Master Events List is prepared for a tabletop simulation exercise. If drills are added for a full scale or live exercise, the Master Events List for the drills should be incorporated.
- 2. The dates and times reflected in the Master Events List are exercise dates and times. Actual dates and times will be determined by the Controllers when planning for the exercise. However, controllers may choose to adopt the times indicated here as actual time.



ACCESS CONTROL PLAN - EXAMPLE

References:

- A. Port Facility Security Plan
- B. ISPS Code Part B sections 16.10 to 16.29

ORGANISATION

1. The organization for security duties is given in Annex A.

INTRODUCTION

2. Current Situation

The security threat situation is serious, with civil unrest and demonstrators challenging the State authorities on many issues and over many fronts. Demonstrations have turned ugly, and rebel elements have announced their intentions to subvert the economy in order to topple the government. They plan to attack infrastructure, transportation and commercial interests known to have links to, or who support the government.

3. Port Facility Premises

- a. The Port Facility premises comprise the area bounded by the sea in the north, Westport Road in the south, TYR Shipyard in the east, and GFD Power Station to the west. It covers an area of 1.5 hectares.
- b. Four 50m wide wharves line the north shore, connected to land by piers that will support 300 tons point load. Each berth can take one 12,000 dwt ship alongside
- c. Offshore Port Facility property includes 8 dolphins for ship berthing and discharge of liquid cargo.

4. The Threat

The State Designated Authority and Maritime Police Force have advised that in addition to the maritime security threats to business operations listed in the ISPS Code, the potential threat to Port Facilities at this time includes terrorist attacks on ships in port in order to hijack a suitable ship to be used as a weapon. Suicide bombers against human targets may also be expected, although it is not expected to be of special significance to this Port Facility. Careful, extended surveillance by the terrorists may be expected prior to any attack. See Annex B (not included) for the intelligence summary provided by the Designated Authority.



5. Existing Port Facility Security Arrangements

a. <u>Security Level 1 Arrangements</u>

(1) Physical Security

- (a) A 1.8m tall wall separates GFD Power Station from the Port Facility. A 2.4m chain link fence topped with barbed wire forms the southern and eastern perimeter. The chain link fence is in very poor condition, with numerous temporary repairs. See Annex C (not included) for the perimeter fence/wall plan.
- (b) There are 3 entrances to the Port Facility. Gate 1 is the Main entrance, situated in the southern-western corner of the south fence. Gate 2 is also in the south fence, in the southeastern corner of the south fence. Personnel may also enter the Port Facility via the passenger boat pier.
- (c) Surveillance video cameras cover the following areas:
 - i. Perimeter fence line and inside of the wall
 - ii. All wharves and piers
 - ii. Restricted Area
 - iv. Control Room
 - vi. All gates
 - vii. Liquid cargo pump room
 - viii. Power sub-station
 - ix. Administrative office lobby
- (d) The cameras along the fence line provide full coverage but cannot zoom in, so some areas have a very distant view. The video surveillance system is subject to frequent breakdowns. These affect the individual cameras, the main camera control system and the monitors. They are repaired by the maintenance contractor as and when required. Repair work has often been slow, and some repair work has taken up to 5 weeks to be done.
- (e) Street lamps provide security lighting at all perimeter fences, walls and wharf areas. Street lamps also provide security lighting along internal roads. Dolphins are unlit. The lighting plan is given in Annex E (not included).



(f) There is an emergency alarm system that is activated from the Control Room and may be heard from anywhere within the Port Facility. This alarm works off the public address system. However, the public address system is prone to breakdowns.

(2) Security Procedures

- (a) Employee access is by a permanent pass system. Employees must display the pass when in the Port Facility premises. Visitor access is by exchange of their personal identification document for a Port Facility Visitor Pass. Visitor passes are issued at the main entrance upon request with valid reasons.
- (b) Entry via the passenger boat pier is by special arrangement, as the boat pier is not manned. This is usually used by the crew and agents of ships alongside at the dolphins.
- (c) Employee and Port Facility vehicle access is by a permanent car label. Visitors' motorcars are not granted access except by special arrangement. Truck and goods vehicle access is by temporary vehicle pass. Vehicle passes are issued at the main entrance. Visual vehicle contents checks are carried out at random.

a. Security Level 2 Arrangements

(1) **Physical Security** – In addition to the Security Level 1 measures,

Employee access via Gate 2 will cease. Gate 2 may still be used for trucks and goods vehicles, by special arrangement.

- (2) Security Procedures In addition to the measures for Security Level 1,
 - (a) Perimeter patrol frequency will be increased by 50%.
 - (b) All personal bags and luggage will be subject to visual inspection. 10% of these bags, taken at random, will be examined in detail.
 - (c) All trucks and goods vehicles will undergo inspection of their contents.



b. Security Level 3 Arrangements

(1) **Physical Security**

- (a) At Security Level 3, pedestrian and vehicle access for employees to/from the Port Facility will be by the main gate only. All other gates will be locked.
- (b) Four temporary barriers will be placed on the road at the main entrance to restrict the flow of traffic, so as to deter sudden forced entry by vehicles. See Annex D (not included) for the temporary barrier layout plan and photographic illustration of the barriers.
- (c) A manned searchlight will be located at security Tower H as shown on the plan at Annex E. It will be used to cover the sea approaches to the wharves, as well as some areas within the Port Facility.

(2) Security Procedures

- (a) All leave and off-duty periods for security personnel will be suspended.
- (b) Perimeter patrol frequency will be increased by 100% from the Security Level 1 condition.
- (c) A permanent guard will be stationed at the entrance to the Restricted Area and wharves.
- (d) An Incident Response Security Team will be formed and placed on standby to provide reinforcements where required
- (e) Visitor access is not permitted except with permission from top management.

6. Port Facility Security Resources

- a. Manpower The Port Facility employs 19 Security Guards, 7 Security Supervisors and 2 Senior Security Supervisors. They are deployed on an 8-hr shift system according to the organization in the chart at Annex A.
- b. Police The PFSO has established regular communications with the State Police responsible for the area, and the State Maritime Police forces patrolling the waters offshore from the Port Facility.



TASK

7. The task of the Port Facility's security force is to enforce access control to Port Facility premises and any other special zones within the Port Facility as determined, in order to preserve the integrity of the Port Facility's security.

CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

- 8. All proposed arrangements are to be read as additional to existing measures and procedures.
 - a. Security Level 1 Arrangements

(1) Physical security

- (a) The existing fence is to be replaced with a new 3m fence, topped with razor wire. Budget permitting, a double fence line is recommended.
- (b) The video surveillance system should be overhauled and a new control system installed. Faulty video cameras for the surveillance system are to be replaced. Cameras with PTZ (pan, tilt and zoom) function should be installed at the fence line to provide 100% coverage of the perimeter fence line and inside of the wall and Restricted Area. Cameras substituted with new PTZ cameras will replace existing faulty cameras and/or be kept as spare units. See Annex F (not included) for the locations and list of cameras to be replaced.
- (c) The contractor for the repair and maintenance of the video surveillance and alarm systems will be required to meet minimum performance requirements. It is proposed that the contractor should meet the following targets:
 - i. Response time maximum of 8 hours
 - ii. Repair time maximum of 24 hours
- (d) Floodlights are to be installed to provide security lighting for the Restricted Area and wharves. See $Annex\ G$ (not included) for the lighting plan.
- (e) The Public Address system should be refurbished, with new speakers to replace those not functioning.

(2) Security Procedures

Inspection of the contents of employee vehicles will be carried out randomly on 20% of the vehicles.



b. Security Level 2 Arrangements

(1) **Physical security**

Two temporary barriers will be placed on the road at the main entrance to restrict the flow of traffic, so as to deter sudden forced entry by vehicles. The temporary barrier layout will be similar to the existing Security Level 3 plan in Annex D (not included), except that only 2 barriers will be used.

(2) Security Procedures

- (a) Visitors without prior appointments will not be permitted, unless accepted on-the-spot by an employee who must be of management-level.
- (b) Inspection of the contents of employee vehicles will be carried out randomly on 50% of the vehicles.

c. Security Level 3 Arrangements

(1) Security Procedures

- (a) Inspection of the contents of all vehicles will be carried out.
- (b) Undercarriage inspection mirrors will be provided and used to supplement the vehicle inspections.

TASK TABLE

9. Security staff will man entrances and conduct 24 hr perimeter and waterside facility patrols during Security Levels 1, 2 and 3 in accordance with the Task Table at Annex H.

SUPPORTING OPERATIONS

- 10. Police land patrols operate regularly along Westport Road. Police have advised that patrols will be stepped-up at Security Level 2. At Security Level 3, State security forces will be present.
- 11. The Maritime Police Force patrols in the sea area off the Port Facility. They have advised that sea patrols will be stepped up progressively at Security Levels 2 and 3, but do not provide details of the patrol lines or timing, citing security reasons.
- 12. Police may be called for backup if suspicious persons/objects are found in the Port Facility.



RULES OF ENGAGEMENT

13 Port Facility security forces are not authorized to use force or firearms in the performance of their duties. Any restraint or detention of suspicious persons or objects must be done with the acquiescence of the individual concerned, and must be followed-up with a report to the Police and handing over to the authorities.

COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS

14. The arrangements in this plan serve as a proposal to management for the revision of the security measures and procedures relating to access control, and maintenance of the integrity of the security arrangements relating to access. All coordination issues should be referred to the PFSO for resolution.

SUPPORTING SERVICES

- 15. Finance has suggested that the budget for the proposed refurbishment of the physical security measures may be available from an extraordinary surplus of \$xxx from the recent hike in wharf service charges.
- 16. Engineering is able to undertake the specification and supervision of the tender for the refurbishment.

COMMUNICATIONS

- 17. The PFSO will be the single point of contact between the Port Facility and supporting forces
- 18. There are no changes to the standard communications plan at the Port Facility, given in Annex I (not included).


Annexes:

- A. Security Organization
- B. Intelligence Summary by Designated Authority (not included)
- *C. Port Facility Layout (not included)*
- D. Barrier Layout Plan (not included)
- E. Current Lighting Plan (not included)
- F. Surveillance Camera Plan (not included)
- G. Proposed Lighting Plan (not included)
- H. Task Table
- *I. Communications Plan (not included)*



Annex A to Appendix 5

SECURITY ORGANISATION



Notes:

- 1. Security Sections are nominally under each Security Supervisor for administrative purposes only.
- 2. Under Security Level 1 and 2 conditions, the 3 security sections will rotate duties, coming directly under the Senior Security Supervisor in the Control Room.
- 3. Security Sections are divided into Teams for the various security tasks.



Annex E to Appendix 5

TASK TABLE

LOCATION	TASK	SECURITY LEVEL		
		1	2	3
Control Room	Console operation	Console operators	Console operators	Console operators
Gate 1	Access control, pass issue, vehicle checks	Section A, Team 1	Section A, Team 1	Section A, Team 1
Gate 2	Access control, vehicle checks	Section A, Team 1 (peak hours only)	-	-
Perimeter	Patrol	Section A, Team 2	Section A, Team 2	Section A, Team 2
fence, wharf			Section B, Team 2	Section B, Team 2
Boat Pier	Access control	Section A, Team 2 (when required)	Section A, Team 2 (when required)	-
Restricted Area	Patrol, access control	Section A, Team 2	Section A, Team 2	Section A, Team 2
Observation Tower	Surveillance	-	Section A, Team 2	Section A, Team 2
Stand-by Force	Rapid response	-	-	Section C, Team 1
etc.				

EXAMPLE REPORT

REPORT ON THE CONDUCT OF SECURITY EXERCISE FE23

INTRODUCTION

1. Exercise FE23 from the APEC Manual of Maritime Security Drills and Exercises Volume II Part 2 was conducted by this Port Facility from 17 to 18 Dec XX. The exercise focused on the measures and procedures for access control at the Port Facility.

<u>AIM</u>

2. The aim of this report is to highlight the lessons learnt and recommendations for implementation by management and security staff of the Port Facility.

PARTICIPANTS

- 3. Exercise Direction and Control
 - a. Exercise Director Mr. HGN, Director, Operations
 - b. Exercise Chief Controller Mr. YHG, Safety and Security Manager
 - c. Exercise High Controller (Operations) Mr. YDH,

etc.

- 4. Exercise Participants
 - a. PFSO-Mr. PLK
 - b. Security Supervisor

etc.

EXERCISE OBJECTIVE

5. The exercise was planned to undertake a comprehensive review of the Port Facility's access control measures and processes, and to practice the command, control, coordination and communications for security activities both within and beyond the Port Facility.

FORMAT

6. The exercise was conducted as a tabletop simulation exercise in two phases. A planning phase culminated in a comprehensive review of access control measures and procedures, and an execution phase practiced the command, control and communications for access control activities at the Port Facility. There was no live or deployment component in this exercise. However, controllers and participants "walked the ground" extensively as part of the planning for the review of the access control measures.



LESSONS LEARNT & RECOMMENDATIONS

- 7. The perimeter fence is in poor condition and should be replaced. The cost-effective option would be to replace the existing chin-link fence.
- 8. The video surveillance system should be refurbished, and new PTZ cameras installed at the fence line to enhance the surveillance capability. The surveillance system maintenance contract should be revised to provide for minimum performance standards.
- 9. The alarm system needs to be overhauled, and new speakers installed to replace those not functioning.
- 10. Vehicle undercarriage inspection mirrors should be acquired.
- 11. Access control procedures for inspection of vehicles entering will be revised to include specific minimum search quotas for each Security Level.

FOLLOW-UP ACTION

12. The PFSO is to monitor the outcome of the recommendations to management, and act on the decisions taken.

CONCLUSION

13. The access control exercise has been a successful platform for the review of the means and processes by which this Port Facility maintains access control. The exercise brought together the stakeholders with accountability for the task, both directly and indirectly to work on the issues affecting the access control measures. The recommendations should be implemented promptly in order to realize the benefits from enhanced Port Facility security, in recognition of the very real threats demonstrated during the exercise.

XYZ Port Facility Maritime Security Exercise

Controller Briefing

date

Unauthorised Access

Exercise FE23

Unauthorised Access

Scope

- Schedule
- Aim
- Objectives
- Required attainments
- Controllers
- ParticipantsExercise Format
- Exercise Product
- Scenario
- Controller Tasks



- Master Events List
- Communications
- Code Words
- Safety
- Resources
- Debrief

Schedule

- Start:
- Estimated End:
- Location:
- Debrief:
- Report by:

Unauthorised Access

<u>Aim</u>

To examine all aspects of the threat of unauthorised access and identify measures to mitigate the vulnerability of the Port Facility



Unauthorised Access

Objectives

- To undertake a comprehensive review of the Port Facility's access control measures and processes
- To practice the command, control, coordination and communications for security activities both within and beyond the Port Facility

Unauthorised Access	
Required Attainments	
Participants will be able to	
Identify and describe the characteristics	
of effective access control measures	
 Recognise access control shortcomings in the Port Facility 	
 Plan and implement measures against unauthorised access at the Port Facility 	
	<u> </u>
	1
Unauthorised Access	
Exercise Director	
Operations Manager, Mr. BBB	
Control Team	
Chief Controller: Deputy Ops Mgr, Mr. AAA	
High Controller (Ops): Safety Mgr, Mr. DDD	-
Low Controller: Snr Security Sup, Mr. XXX	
Unauthorised Access	
51.44.11.01.004.71.00000	-
<u>Participants</u>	
•	
•	

Exercise Format

 A systematic planning process is to be employed to address the access control issues at the Port Facility.



Unauthorised Access

Exercise Format

- To be followed by a tabletop simulation "execution" phase where participants will respond to controller "injects" of incidents
- Drills to be incorporated for a live exercise

Unauthorised Access

Exercise Product

Participants are expected to develop a written operation plan for access control measures for submission to top management

Scenario

Narrative

- Unrest in the country owing to deteriorating economic situation
- Suicide bomb; arson at State library
- Anti-government elements threaten to disrupt economy
- 4 breaches of Port Facility perimeter fence
- 3 cases of attempted unauthorised access
- Operations Manager threatened

Unauthorised Access

Controller Tasks

PLANNING

- To guide participants and provide scenario information
- To record observations and recommendations

TABLETOP SIMULATION

- To introduce injects to trigger participants' responses
- To record observations and recommendations

Unauthorised Access

Master Events List

SERIAL NO.	TIME	FROM	HIGH CONTROL INJECT / LOW CONTROL RESPONSE	PARTICIPANT'S EXPECTED RESPONSE
001	0900	High Control	Issue of Narrative No. 1	Planning for access control commences
002	1630	Managemen t	Endorsement of the Plan	Participants should present the access control plan to top management for endorsement
003	0700	Low Control	Security patrol reports that there is a hole in the perimeter fence big enough to let a person through	Security team 4 to investigate
004	0720	Low Control	The hole is at Fence Section number 34. The fence has been deliberately cut	Maintenance team to restore
005	0750	Low Control	Cut section of the chain link fence has been wired shut. No further action required.	Report on status
006	0800	High Control	Station engineer reports unidentified person seen at pumping station on the wharf without security pass	Security team to investigate
007	0900	Low Control	Pumping station searched thoroughly. Nothing found.	
800	1030	High Control	Gate 1 guards report one man creating a disturbance outside the gate	Report on what is happening

Master Events List

SERIAL NO.	TIME	FROM	HIGH CONTROL INJECT / LOW CONTROL RESPONSE	PARTICIPANT'S EXPECTED RESPONSE	
009	1035	Low Control	One man outside the left side of the gate was shouting and gesticulating wildly. He was screaming abuse at the government. We all went out there to try and pacify him.	Report on status	
010	1100	High Control	Accounts clerk reports unidentified man walking downstairs from the administrative office. He was dressed like a labourer, and was not wearing a security pass. When asked what he was doing there, he rushed down and out of the building.	Security team 4 to investigate	
011	1130	Low Control	Surrounding areas of administrative office searched. Nothing found.	Control room alerted to watch surveillance monitors for stranger	
012	1140	Low Control	Control room surveillance video playback shows man dressed in T-shirt and jeans in ground floor lobby running out of the building	Follow-up on measures for custody of the tape and coordination measures for further investigation	
013	1145	Low Control	There is a man here wanting to visit MV YHN alongside at Wharf Charlie. He has no identification papers to exchange for a security pass. He won't go away and wants to speak to a manager.	To direct security guards to get hiname and ask MV YHN if they know him or are expecting him. If they do, get them to escort him in and take responsibility for him.	

Unauthorised Access

Master Events List

SERIAL NO.	TIME	FROM	HIGH CONTROL INJECT / LOW CONTROL RESPONSE	PARTICIPANT'S EXPECTED RESPONSE
014	1150	Low Control	MV YHN says they do not expect any visitors.	To direct security guards to reject the man's request for entry
015	1155	Low Control	The man has left	
016	1200	High Control	Security team 4 is continuing their search for one or two unidentified persons reported to be in the Port Facility premises	To ask the Station engineer how the person he saw was dressed
017	1215	Low Control	Station engineer reports that he could not tell for sure, but he thinks the man was dressed in jeans and T-shirt	To direct Security Team 4 to continue search for two intruders
018	1300	High Control	Guards at the main gate report a truck delivering ships supplies, but they do not have any record of ships supplies delivery today	To direct security guards to ask for details of the delivery
019	1315	Low Control	The driver says he is delivering oxygen and acetylene welding gas to MV YHN. The truck is filled with 20 cylinders of each gas. There is one assistant with the driver.	To direct security guards to ask MV YHN if the have ordered any supply of welding gas, and from which company.

Unauthorised Access

Master Events List

SERIAL NO.	TIME	FROM	HIGH CONTROL INJECT / LOW CONTROL RESPONSE	PARTICIPANT'S EXPECTED RESPONSE
020	1325	Low Control	Security supervisor at the main gate was talking to the First Officer of MV YHN, when someone came on the line and confirmed that MV YHN had ordered the welding gas, and to kindly let the truck through. He said it was a last minute requirement and they forgot to notify the Port Facility.	To direct security guards to prevent the truck from entry pending further enquiries
021	1330	Low Control	The truck driver was issued with a visitor pass after he submitted a temporary identity document. He claimed that he recently lost his identity document, and he had not received a replacement yet. The truck has already proceeded into the Port Facility	To direct Security team 4 to proceed at once to MV YHN to stop the truck
022	1345	Low Control	Security team 4 reports no truck at MV YHN. Requests description of the truck	To direct Security team 4 to contact main gate for the description
023	1400	High Control	Issue of Narrative No. 2	To issue instructions for increase in Security Level mesures, including exchange of DoS with ships

Master Events List

SERIAL NO.	L TIME FROM HIGH CONTROL INJECT / LOW CONTROL RESPONSE		PARTICIPANT'S EXPECTED RESPONSE		
024	1430	High Control	Security guard reports that a speedboat racing past our Port Facility within the "No Entry" zone had ignored his hand signals and megaphone warning to clear off.	To direct security guards to continue to observe speedboat. To report intrusion to the State maritime and port security agency	
025	1445	Low Control	Security guard reports observing an explosion at a ship alongside a nearby Port Facility. The explosion appeared to have been near the waterline, and the ship is now listing severely.	To report explosion to the State maritime and port security agency	
026	1500	High Control	Truck delivering welding gas to MV YHN has defied orders to stop, and charged out the gate and raced away. It was carrying 3 persons in the cabin.	To direct Security team 4 to chec MV YHN	
027	1530	Low Control	MV YHN has one casualty with a head wound who claims he is the First Officer. He says he was hit on the head and lost consciousness.	To report assault of First Officer t State marine and port security agency. To arrange for medical treatment for the First Officer of MV YHN.	
028	1545	Low Control	Security team 4 reports the SSO says MV YHN did not order any welding gas, and they cannot find any welding gas cylinders on board.	To direct Security team 4 to search the Port Facility's Restricted Area	

Unauthorised Access

Master Events List

SERIAL NO.	TIME	FROM	HIGH CONTROL INJECT / LOW CONTROL RESPONSE	PARTICIPANT'S EXPECTED RESPONSE
029	1600	Low Control	Security team 4 reports finding the welding gas cylinders scattered along the road outside a warehouse with highly flammable cargo stored in it	To direct Port Facility fire services to respond. To inform State marine and port security agency.
030	1610	Low Control	Mechanic reports that he saw the truck going fast around a bend and the cylinders falling off, then the truck raced off without stopping	To address issues and follow-up measures
031	1615	Chief Control	End of exercise	Participants to summarise what they thought had happened.

Unauthorised Access

Communications

- Messages
- Email
- Telephone



 Other communications means as required for drills (if incorporated)

Unauthorised Access Code words Exercise Trojan Horse Exercise name (example only) The exercise is to commence Exercise Go The exercise is to resume from where it was suspended Exercise Stop The exercise is to be terminated (prematurely) For Exercise No Duff The message or statement that follows this preamble relates to a real event or instruction e.g. "No duff, Mr. KLJ has fallen and cut his hand at the Restricted Area Gate 3. Please send a vehicle to pick him up." **Unauthorised Access** Safety • No special safety considerations for the planning and tabletop simulation • Drill safety precautions and RAM to be implemented if drills are incorporated as part of a full scale or live exercise **Unauthorised Access** Resources • Meeting Room 1: Controllers' planning room • Main Conference Participants' planning Room: room • Operations Control Exercise control and

execution

Room:

Resources

- Higher Controller (Ops) to arrange for:
 - -Plan of the Port Facility
 - -Map of the Port Facility precinct
 - -Chart of the Port Facility harbour area
 - -Laptop, projector and screen
 - -Wyteboard and supply of wyteboard markers
 - -Photocopier and stationery

Unauthorised Access

Debrief

- Location:
- Secretary:
- Attendance





Unauthorised Access



end

	_	

XYZ Port Facility Maritime Security Exercise

Participant Briefing

date

Unauthorised Access

Exercise FE23

Unauthorised Access

Scope

- Review
- Schedule
- Aim
- Objectives
- Required attainments
- Controllers
- Participants
- Exercise FormatExercise Product
- Scenario
- Communications



- Code words
- Safety
- Resources
- Debrief
- ISPS update
- Maritime security update

Unauthorised Access

Review of Previous Port Facility Exercise

Date conducted:
Objectives:
Lessons Learnt:

•
•
•
•
Unauthorised Access

<u>Schedule</u>

- Start:
- Estimated End:
- Location:
- Debrief:
- Report by:

Unauthorised Access

Aim

To examine all aspects of the threat of unauthorised access and identify measures to mitigate the vulnerability of the Port Facility



Unauthorised Access Objectives • To undertake a comprehensive review of the Port Facility's access control measures and processes • To practice the command, control, coordination and communications for security activities both within and beyond the Port Facility **Unauthorised Access Required Attainments** Participants will be able to • Identify and describe the characteristics of effective access control measures • Recognise access control shortcomings in the Port Facility • Plan and implement measures against unauthorised access at the Port Facility **Unauthorised Access Exercise Director** Operations Manager, Mr. BBB **Control Team** • Chief Controller: Deputy Ops Mgr, Mr. AAA

• High Controller (Ops): Safety Mgr, Mr. DDD

• Low Controller: Snr Security Sup, Mr. XXX

Unauthorised Access	
<u>Participants</u>	
•	
:	
Unauthorised Access	
Exercise Format	
A systematic	
planning process is to be employed to	
address the access control issues at the	
Port Facility.	
He settle sets at A sees	
Unauthorised Access	
Exercise Format	
To be followed by a tabletop simulation	
"execution" phase where participants will respond to controller "injects" of incidents	
Drills to be incorporated for a live	
exercise	

Exercise Product

Participants are expected to develop a written operation plan for access control measures for submission to top management

Unauthorised Access

Scenario

Narrative

- Unrest in the country owing to deteriorating economic situation
- Suicide bomb; arson at State library
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Unauthorised Access

Communications

- Messages
- Email
- Telephone



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execution

Room:

Resources

- Deputy Operations Manager to arrange for:
 - All operations and administrative stateboards
 - Logs and record books
- Logistics Manager to arrange for:
 - Victuals and refreshments

Unauthorised Access

Debrief

- Location:
- Secretary:
- Attendance





Unauthorised Access

<u>Updates on the ISPS Code and local Regulations</u>



